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This paper does not presume to offer definitive answers to complex questions raised around the
new emphasis on “local communities” in Mozambique. Such answers vary and depend upon the
sociopolitical histories of each community. Instead, the paper briefly explores the concept of
local community in the lexicon of Mozambican law as well as NGO and donor discourse.
This paper argues that a simplified representation of local communities as harmonious and
homogeneous units served a useful purpose in the era of postwar reconciliation and
reconstruction. Now that local communities have begun a process of empowerment, however,
these idealized representations must be broadened to more accurately define and address the
issues of community territoriality and community representation. This must be done in such a
way so as not to promote political polarization nor exacerbate social inequalities predicated on
gender, lineage or other biological characteristics.LOCATING THE COMMUNITY: ADMINISTRATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES IN MOZAMBIQUE
by
Scott Kloeck-Jenson
The Land Tenure Center
University of Wisconsin-Madison
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Mozambican parliament formally approved a new land law, which has the potential
to enhance the tenure security of the country’s rural smallholders. As with a growing body of
Mozambican legislation, the new law might represent a significant step in the process of
devolving authority and autonomy with respect to land and other natural resources to local
indigenous populations throughout the country. This represents a significant departure from
historical trends in which both colonial and post-colonial regimes sought to impose foreign ideas
and philosophies on indigenous populations. In the former case, colonial administrators hoped to
incorporate the Mozambican peasantry into a broader economic system, which exploited local
resources for the financial enrichment of Portuguese business and governmental interests. In the
latter case, policies created largely in reaction to colonial abuses attempted to bypass traditional
local authorities for their supposed complicity with the colonial government. The effect in both
cases was similar: the participation of local groups in the decision-making process was weakened
and very often ignored completely.
This paper does not presume to offer definitive answers to the complex questions raised
around the new emphasis on “local communities” in Mozambique. Such answers vary and
depend upon the sociopolitical histories of each community. Instead, the paper briefly explores
the concept of local community in the lexicon of Mozambican law as well as NGO and donor
discourse.
PERSPECTIVES ON “LOCAL COMMUNITY”
Given Mozambique’s turbulent colonial and recent history, any discussion centering on the
concept of local community must first address the issue of definitions. One critical question
centers on the simple matter of defining local community in territorial terms. An apparently
straightforward model might base assessments on existing state/party boundaries and equate
local communities with what today are called cells or circles. Others would advocate discarding
these predetermined territorial grids and allowing local communities to define themselves, using2
a blend of rural participatory assessment methods and mapping and remote sensing techniques.
However, neither of these alternatives would be problem-free.
A major difficulty with the state/party territorial grid is that legitimacy or acceptability of
the cell or circle boundaries among local populations would vary from region to region or even
within regions. For example, in the District of Maganja da Costa in Zambezia Province, the
majority of persons interviewed in a recent survey made little reference to boundary disputes
with neighboring cells. In that zone, confidence in such territorial limits could, therefore, be
acceptable once contiguous communities recognize and agree on boundaries separating them.
Nevertheless, in the same district, residents of two cells are involved in a bitter, ongoing dispute
over their common border. Clearly, local circumstances would have much to do with defining
community boundaries.
Another problem with existing state or party administrative lines has to do with their
historical origins. Local inhabitants frequently express the conviction that community frontiers
have always been the way they are now. For example, communities often cite Portuguese
colonial maps as proof of population boundaries; these maps, however, were created to facilitate
the expropriation of lands by commercial interests. Also, studies reveal that the Portuguese
colonial administration in the 1930s and 1940s fixed many boundaries in an effort to differentiate
between those populations that were under the control of distinct traditional authorities for
purposes of tribute and corvee labor. Thus, community boundaries established by colonial
authorities for their own commercial purposes cannot be treated as accurate depictions of either
ethnic or communal dividing lines.
Thus, the new emphasis on local community raises complicated questions for the
Mozambican government, donors, international and Mozambican NGOs, and rural dwellers
themselves. Specifically, what is a “local community”? Who is or are the legitimate
representatives of local communities? Upon what basis is that authority or legitimacy
constituted? Are the territorial boundaries of local communities clearly defined and, if so, upon
what basis? How are the communities themselves differentiated on the basis of gender, lineage,
age, or wealth and to what extent do these differences create divergent interests which could,
once local people have greater power and authority to administer their resources, exacerbate
social inequalities and aggravate tensions with the community or beyond?
This paper argues that a simplified representation of local communities as harmonious and
homogeneous units served a useful purpose in the era of postwar reconciliation and
reconstruction. Now that local communities have begun a process of empowerment, however,
these idealized representations must be broadened to more accurately define and address the
issues of community territoriality and community representation. This must be done in such a
way so as not to promote political polarization nor exacerbate social inequalities predicated on
gender, lineage or other biological characteristics.
RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Following independence, the ruling Frelimo party adopted an ideological approach, which
centralized political and economic decision-making authority within a Marxist vanguard party-
state (Hall and Young 1997). Nationalizing ownership of land and centralizing control over land
and its resources was viewed as a critical component in the drive to construct socialism3
throughout the country. While the state assumed ownership over land, smallholder families and
communities retained their use rights to the land they occupied under customary tenure. In part,
the decision to nationalize land was rooted in a Marxist-inspired dualism that pitted a
“traditional,” fairly homogenous (“semi-feudal”) peasant sector against “modern” capitalist elites
that would, if land was not nationalized, entice or deceive smallholders into selling their land for
minimal financial return and short-term gain (O’Laughlin 1996).
A critical component of this strategy was to wrest allocative and adjudicatory power over
land away from traditional authorities whom Frelimo had derided as colonial puppets and
lackeys throughout the struggle for independence. Arguing that these traditional authorities had
mercilessly exploited rural dwellers in their colonial roles as labor recruiters, tax collectors, and
local policing agents, Frelimo attempted to banish such figures and replace them with
community-level party representatives (secretarias) that were vertically integrated into a
state/party hierarchy emanating from the capital, Maputo. As individuals imbued with “modern”
socialist notions, these secretaries presumably would replace lineage elders and traditional
authorities as the primary actors allocating land and resolving community conflicts (West 1997).
Certainly by the early 1990s, it became increasingly transparent that the national legal and
regulatory framework governing land use rights left investors, both smallholders and larger
commercial interests, with insecure tenure rights. Studies by the Land Tenure Center at the
University of Wisconsin–Madison revealed that the process in which state farm enterprises were
privatized (through the establishment of joint venture companies with international commercial
firms) lacked transparency. In some cases, the privatization process alienated land from
neighboring communities or those families that had been occupying state farm land, thereby
exacerbating political tensions in the countryside (West and Myers 1996; Myers and West 1993).
Even more troubling was the accumulating evidence that provincial-level officials were
granting land concessions to individuals and commercial firms without consulting rural
smallholders regarding their use rights of a requested parcel of land. In theory, district
government officials were required to ensure that smallholders in the “family sector”—who
usually lacked written title—were not already occupying or otherwise using the requested parcel
of land. In practice, however, district-level officials frequently were left out of the process. Even
if involved, such officials rarely had the resources or perhaps the inclination (especially during
the war) to consult with such communities. Instead, they posted the proposed land request in the
office of the district administrator or the district director of agriculture, a location where the
affected people would be very unlikely to see it, much less possess the requisite literacy skills to
read it (Myers and Meneses 1995). In addition, even in cases where community consultation may
have occurred, government officials could still authorize the land concession request despite
community claims that they were already occupying the land.
LEGISLATION
Recent attitudes toward community participation in natural resource management are most
clearly represented in two arenas: forestry and land tenure. After many years of debate, the 1997
land law makes, among other things, a serious effort to involve local communities in land tenure
issues. With respect to forested land, the national parliament began to discuss legislation that
would modify the administration of forest resources, and the law was passed in July 1998.4
There is a popular, but mistaken, perception that the 1997 land law and its accompanying
regulations require local communities to be consulted regarding forestry activities. Short-term
timber extraction licenses (licenses simples) and long-term forestry concessions (contratos de
concessões florestais por arrendamento) grant only limited use rights to a particular area.
Holders of the land, be they a medium-sized investor producing cotton or a non-titled
smallholder farmer, can continue to reside on the land and engage in agricultural activities. The
1997 land law only addresses situations in which entities request acquisition of full and exclusive
land use rights (direitos de uso e aproveitamento de terra) either through occupancy or the
formal titling process. Thus, the land law’s procedures for consultative requirements are not
applicable for forestry license and concession requests.
The draft forestry and wildlife law made periodic references to the importance of
community participation in the management of natural resources. Nevertheless, the general tenor
of the draft legislation was one that  protects rather than  empowers local communities. For
example, Articles 10 to14 of the draft forestry law outlined a process for acquiring forestry
concessions and short-term timber extraction licenses that provides no steps in which community
opinions are elicited. The draft law encouraged, rather than required, local community
involvement in deciding how to use local resources (Article 3b, Article 14).
Unlike the land law and its accompanying regulations, the draft forestry and wildlife
legislation also failed to grant local communities the authority to block logging activities or to
negotiate with companies regarding material advantages in the form of employment, social
services, or a share of the profits. As with the current legal framework, state officials and not
local communities would continue to define and decide how best to promote local community
interests. Current realities suggest that such an approach is prone to abuse and leaves local
communities with few incentives to assist state officials in the difficult task of monitoring timber
harvesting.
The 1998 draft of the forestry law discussed the importance of community participation in
conserving forests. Further, it stated that forestry concessions would not permit the
concessionaire to proscribe local inhabitants from harvesting forest products for non-commercial
purposes, preserving local communities’ access to forestry and wildlife resources for customary
and subsistence-based practices (Articles 3b; 3e; 9; 14). Overall, however, the language and
tenor of the proposed forestry law does not establish a framework that the government’s own
agricultural and natural resource program (PROAGRI) specifies as critical to the success of their
forestry and wildlife programs—a framework in which local communities are empowered to
assume a more proactive role in managing their resources and in interacting with state and
private investors.
Perhaps most problematic is the fact that the forestry and wildlife law is supposed to be
another brick in an emerging legal and regulatory edifice in which both smallholders and other
investors enjoy clear and secure tenure rights over land and other natural resources. The land law
is the cornerstone of this edifice. Unfortunately, the draft forestry and wildlife legislation failed
to require community consultations; by conferring only limited use rights to local communities
over forest resources, the law made a potentially contradictory contribution.5
ROLE OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN FOREST MANAGEMENT
Interviews with government and logging company officials demonstrate that to the extent that
they envision communities participating in the forest harvesting and management process, their
role is primarily to assist in identifying good tree stands, enforce government rules, and perhaps
garner a few material perks in the form of local employment and token gifts. Indeed, the replies
of the provincial head of the forestry and wildlife department to two questions is revealing.
When discussing the requirements of enforcing logging rules and regulations, he stated that the
involvement of local communities is absolutely critical: “Even if we in the SPFFB had
helicopters and many more personnel, Zambezia province is vast and it would be impossible to
monitor the entire province. This is why local communities will be so important.” Later in the
same interview, however, when the same individual was asked whether local communities
receive any money or a share of the profits from logging activities, he replied that he wasn’t
certain and that such arrangements would depend upon each individual logging firm. In short,
while this official expects the communities to expend energy and resources to help enforce
logging regulations, he has barely considered what material benefits communities may or may
not be receiving or can and should demand in exchange.
This attitude is probably the norm, as demonstrated by the ways in which logging companies
currently interact with local communities in Zambezia province. When the representatives of
four companies were asked about benefits local communities acquired in the process, all
emphasized local employment opportunities.
1 Although the company employs its own personnel
for more technical activities (drivers, equipment operators), they hire local inhabitants to clear
paths, identify tree stands, and transport and load logs when equipment cannot be used. Beyond
providing employment opportunities, one firm noted that a nurse hired to assist employees also
provides medical services to non-employees residing in the areas; the same firm also purchased a
maize mill for one community.
The general rule, however, is for local companies to do little more than purchase articles for
a traditional ceremony venerating spirits in the forest (which entails alcohol, meat, rice, or maize
meal) and perhaps provide soap, cloth or other items to selected community members. The reply
of one company official to the question on whether he pays local communities for the right to
harvest timber is revealing: “I would not say ‘pay’; rather I would use the word ‘thank’” (“Nao
diria pagar; diria agradecer”). Indeed, the dominant paradigm influencing the thinking of
government officials and private operators is one in which local communities are, at best, minor
custodians of forest resources who should be acknowledged and gratified with insignificant
forms of tribute and patronage. They are not perceived as owners of the forests with whom one
must negotiate. Indeed, as already discussed, current legislation and practices provide no reasons
for thinking otherwise.
It is important to emphasize that the problem may not only rest with government officials
and logging companies. Local communities, after years of colonial and post-independence rule in
which they have not been consulted or have been ignored in decisions regarding the use of
                                               
1 Many of the individuals employed are related to local leaders. One company representative noted that he always
pays a salary to the local traditional authority, even though the individual is not required to work. Another company
official noted that many of the individuals hired are relatives or close associates of the traditional authority, party
secretary, or other local leader.6
forestry resources, may not have a keen sense of ownership. One NGO representative noted that
when smallholders were asked during seminars on the new land law who they believed owns the
forests, the common replies were “God” or “the State.” It could be that while community
members recognize that forests are within the domain of a particular community, the boundaries
of which are often perceived as being rooted in “tradition” or “custom,” this does not translate
into a perception that they have clear property rights that can be relied upon to extract material
advantages for themselves. At the same time, this is an issue that requires further research, the




In assessing the winners and losers in the process of defining legal access to and decision-
making authority over natural resources, a variety of authors and practitioners have presented a
somewhat simplified analysis. These have tended to pit an undifferentiated smallholder sector
against avaricious economic and political elites whose acquisition of land necessarily impinges
on the interests of the former. Recently, a number of scholars have begun to question the reliance
upon images of undifferentiated groups of smallholders or local rural communities pitted against
similarly undifferentiated “largeholders” that may or may not have ties to state elites.
For example, in an unveiled critique of the analytical reliance upon “dualisms” such as
smallholder and largeholder or “traditional” subsistence production and capitalist cash economy,
O’Laughlin (1996) points out that smallholders have historically not exclusively relied upon
subsistence agricultural production to secure their livelihood. Instead, rural livelihoods and food
security also have been conditioned on the opportunities for wage labor and off-farm
employment within or outside of Mozambique. Differentiation within local communities,
O’Laughlin argues, is a complex and ongoing historical process linked to the nature of each
family’s historical insertion into southern Africa’s various labor regimes as well as to the
family’s control over critical agricultural means of production such as land, cattle, and
agricultural implements.
The problem with a dualist conception of a traditional, homogenous peasantry standing in
opposition to large-scale commercial enterprises is that it “leads to a narrow focus on land
ownership as the major issue in rural class structure and to an overemphasis of the importance of
‘traditional’ chiefs as a cultural and political institution in rural life” (O’Laughlin 1996, p. 2).
O’Laughlin suggests that any long-term economic recovery in rural areas cannot be predicated
simply upon improvements in smallholder production but must also include revitalization of
other sectors, such as the commercial sector, to reestablish not only marketing infrastructure but
also provide sources of wage employment.
                                               
2 “I would suggest that communities and smallholders may have a very different concept of ownership of land and
natural resources such as land, water, and forests, that they may not regard them as privately-owned assets to be
exploited for personal profit” (commentary by Dr. Lastarria-Cornhiel).7
CONCLUSIONS
Considerable disagreement exists within Mozambique regarding who should speak for local
communities. Opposition members in parliament suggest that régulos and traditional authorities
are the legitimate representatives of their communities. Others challenge this position, arguing
that community-level authority structures in Mozambique vary and that such heterogeneity
should be preserved by not declaring that a particular group of individuals (such as régulos)
should represent local communities. Members of these communities should instead decide for
themselves who best represents their interests.
The Mozambican government deserves much credit for having formulated and approved one
of the most promising legal frameworks in sub-Saharan Africa with respect to strengthening
smallholder land tenure security. If effectively implemented, it can also facilitate the creation of
a more constructive relationship between rural communities and outside investors seeking land
use rights in such communities.
For this potential to be realized, the government will obviously need adequate resources to
carry out local community consultations. At present, many provincial cadastral offices do not
possess vehicles to travel to rural communities; the situation is even worse for personnel from
some district administrations. Clearly, a critical element in realizing the land law’s potential will
be the provision of adequate logistical and other material resources to the relevant state
institutions.
Also important, however, will be the creation of a clear set of procedures that ensures that
local communities have adequate time to select accountable individuals who can represent
community interests in a process that is clearly documented and that facilitates well-informed
decision-making. Such as procedure has been defined for consulting local communities in the
formal titling process of land. A similar process may be needed for forestry management and
concessions.
Interpreting the implications of different pieces of legislation through the prism of
“largeholder” and “smallholder” interests has provided a simplifying logic that helped highlight
the need for devolving more power to local communities. Continuing reliance on such
categorizations will be necessary as the government clarifies the practical implications of broader
principles enshrined in the 1997 land law. Nevertheless, as communities begin exercising their
new rights and responsibilities over land and natural resources, research that assesses ongoing
dynamics within and between communities will be critical. This is especially true given that any
decentralization of power or authority will be accompanied by a decentralization of the struggle
over resources, which will have divergent effects on differing groups within communities.
In an effort to address some of the imbalances and injustices associated with a colonial past
and a turbulent post-independence history, Mozambique has looked to “local communities” as a
vehicle through which the rural peasantry can be empowered to protect its individual and
communal rights. A simplified version of the concept has proved useful in the early years of the
post-colonial era, but must now be broadened to more accurately define local communities and
delimit the scope of responsibilities devolving on their legitimate representatives. It goes without
saying that a key in this process will be the identification of truly representative spokespersons
and their empowerment to enable participation in legal and institutional processes that safeguard
the tenuous position of rural smallholders.8
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